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ABSTRACT
Most organizations and government agencies regularly become engaged in
litigation with suppliers, customers, clients, employees, competitors,
shareholders, prosecutors or regulatory agencies that nearly assures the need to
organize, retain, find and produce business records and correspondence, emails, accounting records or other data relevant to disputed issues. This article
discusses some high visibility cases that constrain how metadata and content is
routinely made available to opposing parties in civil litigation, to prosecutors in
criminal prosecutions and to agency staff in regulatory enforcement litigation.
Public policy, as implemented in the rules of evidence and pretrial discovery,
restrict electronic data discovery (EDD) as it becomes a predominant and
potentially costly pre-trial activity pivotal to modern litigation. This article
discusses these constraints while identifying opportunities for the
interdisciplinary activities among litigators, forensic experts and information
technology professionals.
Keywords: electronic data discovery, cyber forensics, pre-trial discovery,
litigation hold, spoliation, obstruction of justice, electronic records
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management, metadata
“As a litigator, I will tell you documents are just the bane of our existence.
Never write when you can speak. Never speak when you can wink.”1
1. INTRODUCTION
The quote above might be adapted to the emerging arena of electronic data
discovery (EDD) and cyber forensics as follows: “Never email when you can
write, never write when you can phone, and never phone when you can meet
face to face.” While such defensive practices might seem to avert potential
“smoking gun” disclosures, they also can promote a corporate culture of coverup and risky behavior inconsistent with good public and corporate policy. This
article employs traditional doctrinal legal research to review the emerging field
of EDD under criminal, civil and regulatory process and provide analysis of the
implications for cyber forensics and sound electronic records management
practices.
Eventually every company, not-for-profit organization, non-governmental
organization, self-regulatory organization or government agency will end up in
litigation or involved in a governmental investigation or regulatory action,
some as a plaintiff to enforce rights or claims, but most as a defendant. Claims
can be filed by customers, shareholders, former employees, competitors, or by
watchdog regulatory agencies such as the Security and Exchange Commission,
Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue Service or the U.S. Justice
Department. In the event of litigation or governmental investigations, it is a
virtual certainty that records will be subpoenaed, including business records,
correspondence, and phone logs and emails related to the disputed issue.
Many people who use email for its speed and efficiency, as compared with
phone calls or face-to-face meetings, run a significant risk - phone calls and
personal conservations are evanescent unless wiretapped or recorded. By
contrast, email is persistent since it is recorded and preserved by the sender, the
recipient and various network servers and ISPs during transmission. Recent
high visibility cases in which emails and electronic evidence played a critical
role, now clearly signal that nearly any electronic record is subject to
compulsory “discovery,” the mandatory pre-trial process of obtaining
information from before trial through demands on opposing and third parties.
The discovery of electronic information includes the recovery of both content
and meta data of such records during the pre-trial discovery phase of criminal
and civil litigation as well as in investigations by regulatory agencies. Anyone
1

Statement of panelist Jordan Eth, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, Nov.10,
2005, panel hosted by the National Law Journal and Stanford Law School’s Center on Ethics,
reprinted in National Law Journal, 12 December 2005.
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with a legally-enforceable interest involved in the litigation, has the right to
demand traditional paper records, as well as electronic communications, to use
to prove or to contest facts at issue in legal proceedings. The term, electronic
data discovery (EDD) is generally becoming applied to a wide range of
electronic document acquisition from opposing parties, potentially adverse
parties or third parties, in preparation for civil, criminal and regulatory
proceedings.
Many people still remember the famous enforcement action against Merrill
Lynch when it’s star security analyst Henry Blodget referred in internal emails
to a “dot.com” company that Merrill had underwritten and which he had
recommended to Merrill Lynch’s investor clients as “a piece of junk” and “a
powder keg.” These email disclosures revealed blatant conflicts of interest
between Merrill Lynch’s underwriting activities and its investment advisory
divisions. Public disclosure of these conflicts of interest by New York Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer caused significant damage to Merrill Lynch’s reputation
and was a pivotal factor in the $100 million civil fine in the settlement with
New York State and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.2
Litigants on both sides can be required to help identify and to disclose emails
and archived internal and external communications (including email files, chat
files, network server logs, and network back-up tapes) which may be relevant
to disputed issues involved in litigation or investigations once such records are
requested by an opposing party. Many persons may still incorrectly believe that
such internal electronic communications and records are “private” or can be
relatively easily destroyed. The reality is that EDD often has the ability to
provide a roadmap of “who knew what and when,” which is so pivotal in
litigation. The costs of electronic records management (ERM) and of
responding to mandatory EDD discovery requests are very significant,
including the search of email and document files residing on employees’
desktop and laptop hard drives and restoring network backup tapes, and even
“recovering” deleted files from hard drives of persons potentially relevant to
the litigation or investigation. Such costs of responding to EDD discovery
requests can easily exceed a quarter of a million dollars in business litigation.
The threat of discovery costs, even before EDD became a predominant focus in
litigation, could sometimes be used as a “club” to force opposing parties into
pre-trial settlements in order to avoid much higher discovery costs. Judicial
penalties for an insufficient response to a discovery request or for concealment
or destruction of requested or potentially relevant records can be severe,
including legal sanctions for spoliation in civil and regulatory investigations
and obstruction of justice charges in criminal cases. Another famous 2002 case
is illustrative, when Martha Stewart was prosecuted for obstruction of justice
for trying to cover-up behavior that could indicate that her sudden sale of 3,928
2

SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 03 CV 2941 (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2003).
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shares of ImClone stock was based on inside information.3 Her criminal
conviction for obstruction of justice in 2004 largely rested on electronic
evidence indicating tampering with potential evidence.
2. DEFINING ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY
After litigation has commenced with the filing of a complaint and well before
the trial takes place, there is a (usually lengthy) period of trial preparation
during which facts are gathered and information is requested from all parties,
and parties must make requested but unprivileged information available to the
opposition. The rules of pretrial discovery require production of requested
information, so long as the information is potentially relevant to the issues in
dispute, even if this disclosure would weaken or compromise the producing
party’s interests. All litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, may demand
production of documents and “data compilations” relevant to the prosecution,
complaint or defense of an issue from almost any party in possession, custody
or control of that information. This document production duty is required in
U.S. federal courts in civil cases under the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure
(Fed.R.Civ.P.)4 and in criminal cases under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Fed.R.Crim.P.) as well as under similar civil and criminal discovery
rules in all the U.S. states. Fed.R.Civ.P.Rule 34(a) broadly defines the potential
sources of discoverable data as “writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phonorecords,5 and other data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through
detection devices into reasonably usable form.” Therefore, data compilations
exposed to discovery include reports, correspondence, memos, text files,
spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, digital photos, graphics and art, email
including all attachments, instant messages and any other data created on or
stored on a computer, computer network or any other electronic storage media.
Often one party in litigation (or an investigation) may not be in possession of
sufficient facts or evidence to prove the other party’s fault. Under U.S. pretrial
discovery rules, parties may not hide, destroy nor deny an opposing party
access to most forms of potentially-incriminating evidence by claiming
proprietary control. The formulation of “justice” in the U.S. gives all litigants
the right to request and examine records, files, or other evidence from the
opposing party if the latter holds exclusive control over such information. With
great frequency, pre-trial discovery often unearths evidence critical to the
requester’s success. Consider the high visibility $253 million jury verdict in
3

U.S. v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1).
5
Under U.S. copyright law the term “phonorecord” is broadly defined to include analog vinyl
and streaming tape recordings as well as digital recordings “fixed” in magnetic and optical
media.
4
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2005 against Merck, maker of the prescription painkiller Vioxx - a Cox-2
inhibitor.6 Merck defended this claim that Vioxx had caused the plaintiff to
suffer a fatal heart attack by arguing that arrhythmia or irregular heartbeat had
caused the death and not a blood clot produced by Vioxx as the plaintiff
alleged. However, the jury was likely greatly influenced by a 1997 internal
email authored by Merck’s own research scientist Alise Reicin, that was
disclosed in response to a discovery request from the plaintiff. In the email,
sent two years before the FDA approved Vioxx for sale to the public, the
Merck research scientist worried that “the possibility of increased CV (cardio
vascular) events is of great concern.” Vioxx was subsequently withdrawn from
the market by Merck in September, 2004.
Until the 1990’s, discovery requests for the production of documents mostly
involved paper records. Much of the content of personal communications
including phone calls and face-to-face conversations and meetings was
effectively unavailable unless there were contemporaneous written notes, tape
recordings or the conversation was recalled in a witness’ testimony under oath
or in a deposition. The probative value of witness recall depends on witness’
credibility as tested by cross-examination and on the strength of rebutting
evidence. Today, however, most business records are in electronic form and a
massive amount of both external and internal communication within and
between organizations is transmitted through networks in digital form. Because
of this, EDD has become perhaps the most important source of evidence in
criminal and civil litigation as well as in government and regulatory
investigations.
According to one study published in 2003 on the proliferation of electronic
data, over 90% of business documents are created and stored electronically.7
While the rapid increase in the overall percentage of business records and
communications in electronic form is slowing, the absolute percentage of such
records in electronic form will only continue to grow. Most intra-corporate and
intra-governmental communication is conducted via email with a growing use
of even newer electronic communications technologies including instant
messaging and blogs. Each email contains an electronic record that includes
not only the content of the email and any file attachments, but also the
metadata embedded in the message which reveals the sender, the recipients,
and the sequence and timing of linked messages and attachments. Such
metadata helps to provide additional “who, what, when” detail to the content of
communications. Electronic telephone logs and electronic voice mail
repositories are also discoverable and will likely increase in importance as
usage of voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP) proliferates.
6

Ernst, et. al. v. Merck & Co. Inc., No. 19961- BH02, (D.C. Tex. Brazoria Co. 2005).
Lyman, Peter and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information, 2003. Retrieved from
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003 on [12.20.05].
7
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In addition to email, other persistent electronic records may be useful in
proving facts, impeaching witnesses or casting doubt on an opponent’s
depiction. These electronic records can include documents created, altered or
stored on computers, logs of network user access, records of web site visits,
records of web site content downloaded, identity and dates of voice mail
callers, employee security access code usage (access cards to physical
locations, floors and offices, and parking facility access), some of which may
be further corroborated by video surveillance tapes. E-Zaps and many other
automated toll collection authorities frequently must respond to subpoenas for
toll use records identifying customers and registered vehicle, time, date and
location for various evidentiary purposes in legal and regulatory matters. Such
advances over the past decade in both the amount and variety of information
created and retained in electronic form has transformed litigation in the U.S.
Innovations in technology continue to expand the types of electronic data
discoverable. Consider how voicemail is shifting from individual desktop
recorders to networked digital storage of voicemail messages. Unless
effectively purged, voicemail may become as permanent and accessible as is
email today resulting in much more voicemail discovery. This architecture
holds the promise for unpleasant surprises because currently voicemails are
most often preserved only by the recipient, not the sender. Indeed, it is unlikely
senders can produce voicemails if sought in discovery making employers of
most senders ignorant of the precise voicemail content and ignorant of the
general content of renegade employees. It is costly to identify all potential
voicemail recipients and request recipient recordings. Voicemail search
technologies are still developing and as yet are neither as sophisticated nor
effective as are search methods for screening email records for keywords in
key fields such as sender, recipient(s), time, date, routing, attachments and
subject matter.
3. ELECTRONIC RECORDS SUBJECT TO DISCOVERY
Targets of electronic data discovery requests or subpoenas can include anyone
possessing information potentially relevant to issues, subject matter and
participants in an investigation or litigation. Many potentially-discoverable
email messages are archived on network server backup tapes, by third party
service providers, at ISPs (e.g., Hotmail, Yahoo, AOL), on personal digital
assistants (PDA) and Blackberry devices, on cell phones, on personal laptop
and home computers and in various personal storage media (e.g., floppies,
portable hard drives, thumb/jump/USB flash drives). External archives and
caches of Internet content can be used to retrieve the past content of web sites
and web pages previously posted but later “taken down” and such Internet web
archives are often admissible evidence in the proof of infringement, internet
domain name misuse, defamation, trade libel, harassment, misrepresentation,
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and fraud.8 Litigators now often refer to doing a "Wayback”, a search of
proprietary archives of website materials for a potential adversary’s prior
Internet postings, to assist litigation strategies.
It is important to note that both federal and state discovery rules permit
requests for preservation of potentially relevant records to be served on persons
in control of such records even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed or such
persons are not yet parties to a legal action or governmental investigation.
Compliance with discovery requests is mandatory for opposing parties and
their employees and agents. With some very limited exceptions for
“privileged” communications, such as the attorney-client communications
concerning pending litigation and investigations and the attorney work product
privilege, almost all information is discoverable from almost any opposing
party or third party source. Depending on the situation, there are other
important, but typically narrowly construed privileges, such as the spousal
privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, and in
much more limited situations the accountant-client privilege and the selfevaluation privilege. Even when unprivileged information is obtained in
discovery, its use and public disclosure may be limited by various types of
confidentiality, such as court records held under seal by a judge’s order for
trade secrets or national security matters. Increasingly, confidentiality
requirements or secrecy orders may suppress disclosure of divorce records and
information about juveniles and minors. Unless specific public policy
exceptions like the very limited privileges discussed above are applicable, there
is no general right to privacy in the U.S. that prevents discovery of potentially
incriminating information or other evidence damaging to a party’s interest.9
Metadata is another important aspect of electronic records that many business
executives and government leaders are still unaware of. Metadata is literally
“data about data” that accompanies data files and electronic communications.
A “metadata tag” will indicate various aspects of every file created on a
computer, including the file creation date, the identity of the computer on
which it was created, the IP address from which it was accessed, dates of
editing or simply last viewed/opened and by whom, and all subsequent
alterations and deletions. Email metadata may also show the sender’s address
book information, dispatch and receipt date of messages, information about
forwarding or replies, and the existence or content of attachments. Metadata
can be useful in showing the sequence and authorship of critical
8

The Internet Archive claims that its Wayback Machine contains “approximately 1 petabyte of
data and is currently growing at a rate of 20 terabytes per month.” See http://www.archive.org/.
9
In the high visibility antitrust case against Microsoft, an email by Bill Gates sent from his home
computer, on a Sunday evening, to someone outside Microsoft, concerning the competitive
objective of bundling Internet Explorer with Windows was held not to be protected by Mr.
Gates’ personal right to privacy and was admitted as proof relevant to Mr. Gates’ state of mind.
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communications. For example, in the 2004 criminal trial of Martha Stewart for
obstruction of justice in the Imclone affair, the U.S. Department of Justice used
metadata from an electronic log of office phone calls that indicated that a log of
one phone call had been erased and later restored on a different computer. The
Department of Justice used this evidence of tampering with the evidence, when
correlated with an electronic diary entry showing a meeting with her Merrill
Lynch broker, to argue that the defendants had met to develop a “cover story”
to explain the sudden sale of her Imclone stock, and later attempted to cover-up
the meeting. Despite evidence that Ms. Stewart had second thoughts almost
immediately and allegedly reentered the erased phone log entry on her own
office computer, this metadata record supported the government’s contention
that she had attempted to tamper with evidence of the alleged meeting and
cover-up. Additional forms of metadata are evolving as the architecture of
communications methods evolves. The capture and association of user IP
addresses with particular web site visits by ISP web servers and the potential
for court orders to require disclosure of identity of web users will likely
significantly limit the anonymity of web communications and transactions.
Such IP user access records are used by law enforcement agencies to identify
purveyors and users of child pornography on the web or to identify both those
serving and those downloading content using peer-to-peer networks.
3.1 “Litigation Hold” Compliance
All persons, businesses, institutions and government agencies have a legal duty
to preserve records relevant to “reasonably expected” investigations and
litigation. Thus, when litigation or a governmental investigation becomes
“reasonably expected” the target of such litigation or investigation must
immediately issue a “litigation hold”10 throughout the organization that
preserves all potentially-relevant evidence. Delays of only a few days in
implementing a litigation hold might result in the automatic overwriting and
permanent loss of network backup tapes containing emails potentially relevant
to the pending litigation or investigation, which in turn can lead to charges of
spoliation. Because of this, all organizations need to have electronic records
management (ERM) programs in place that specify document retention and
destruction policies depending on various factors such as time, date, subject
matter of file, internal needs, etc., and which may be suspended in the even of a
litigation hold. Consider the landmark (and extremely lengthy) EDD case of
Zubulake v. UBS-Warburg11 in which UBS was ultimately ordered to pay $29.3
10

A provisional definition of litigation hold is that it is a legal duty to suspend routine document
destruction when a lawsuit is filed or is reasonably anticipated. This definition is amplified in the
ensuing text.
11
Eight related Zubulake decisions were issued between 2003 and 2005: Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I: allocating discovery costs for email
production from backup tapes); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, No. 02 Civ. 1243, 2003 WL
21087136 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003) (Zubulake II: Zubulake’s reporting obligations); Zubulake v.

12

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(1)
million for gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims filed by a
former female stock broker. The female stock broker plaintiff made discovery
requests for all UBS internal emails sent by her alleged harasser that were
expected to support the claim of harassment.
The judge in Zubulake described the litigation hold process for electronic
evidence and email as follows:
Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a “litigation hold”
to ensure the preservation of relevant documents. As a general rule, that
litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those
typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which
may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company's
policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible (i.e., actively used
for information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be subject to the
litigation hold.
However, it does make sense to create one exception to this general rule. If
a company can identify where particular employee documents are stored on
backup tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key players” to the
existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the information
contained on those tapes is not otherwise available. This exception applies
to all backup tapes.12
When about to initiate litigation, an opposing party’s counsel may send a
“preservation demand” to parties to the lawsuit demanding that they preserve
email files and other evidence potentially relevant to a threatened lawsuit,
which in turn will trigger a responsibility on the part of the targets of such
preservations demands not to destroy backup tapes where such email records
are likely to be located. Once a lawsuit is filed and pre-trial discovery begins,
interrogatories are a useful tool that can be used to identify the existence and
location of potentially useful electronic records and witnesses. These are
written questions requiring the opposing party’s answers under oath.
Once a litigation hold arises, there are numerous and significant legal
UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III: allocating costs between parties
for restoration of email backup tapes), Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (Zubulake IV: duty to preserve emails; defendant bears plaintiff's re-deposition costs)
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V: sanctions
granted; UBS ordered to pay costs; defense counsel ordered to monitor compliance and preserve
with a litigation hold); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 231 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.2, 2005)
(Zubulake Va); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2005)
(Zubulake VI: preventing admission of various evidence); and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 02CV-1243 (April 6, 2005) (Zubulake jury verdict: $29.3 million in damages - $9.1 million
compensatory, nearly $20.2 million punitive).
12
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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consequences. Legal counsel must immediately notify the information
technology personnel to immediately discontinue destruction of records and
backup tapes containing potentially relevant files. It is advisable to request the
IT department to explicitly acknowledge the implementation of a litigation
hold in order to avoid misunderstandings or slip-ups. Document destruction
must cease immediately and preservation efforts must be undertaken for
relevant emails, electronic documents and records, and backups. A written
preservation plan with linked procedures should be developed that designates
specific electronic evidence and emails for preservation and then the plan
should be distributed to all employees potentially in control or possession of
relevant evidence. Outside or independent directors of corporations should also
be instructed to preserve relevant documents and records.13 Litigation hold
notices should provide reasons for identifying and preserving specific records,
such as potential future litigation or regulatory enforcement actions, filed
lawsuits or complaints, preservation letter, or a court order requiring the
preservations of records. The notice should also warn of serious sanctions for
failure to comply.
Large organizations that are regularly engaged in litigation need to have EDD
teams already organized to quickly and effectively implement a litigation hold
including experienced members from IT, legal, human resources and other inhouse and third party records management professionals. Litigation hold
compliance must be actively monitored to guard against inadvertent destruction
of relevant records or the appearance that such records have been tampered
with. All files containing potentially relevant evidence should be preserved in
an electronic mirror image “snap shot” as soon as the litigation hold attaches,
in order to authenticate the pre-discovery state of such records and to establish
the “chain of custody” before any internal review of these records for
potentially relevant files is undertaken. An internal review of files from
desktop, laptop and handheld computers of the key employees potentially
involved in litigation is usually necessary determine whose emails, files or
Internet activity may contain potentially relevant emails or documents, but this
should be done only after an archival “snapshot” of such files is made in
unopened form, since opening or forwarding such files for in-house review will
alter metadata in the files which may give the appearance that such files were
subsequently tampered with. Electronic forensics experts, often third party
service providers are frequently needed to recover or preserve evidence,
particularly where relevant evidence may exist on backup tapes or erased or
deleted files on employee computers. Such experts employ procedures and
software that can authenticate the chain of custody and thereby refute charges
of alteration or destruction post-litigation hold date. Backup media must be
preserved to avoid charges of post-litigation hold date tampering.
13

See In re Triton Energy, Ltd. Securities Litigation, 2002 WL 32114464 (E.D. Tex.
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4. ALLOCATING COSTS OF ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY
Some critics of U.S. litigation practices have argued that pre-trial discovery is
so costly that it can be intentionally deployed to coerce defendants into
arguably unjust, but perhaps cheaper, settlements. Indeed, several proposed
reforms of product liability, tort liability and securities litigation involve a
litigation “stay” that serves to halt litigation in order to enable defendants to
challenge unsubstantiated litigation claims before significant discovery costs
have to be incurred.14 Judges have long had the power to consider the
oppressive costs of discovery. The basic discovery rule in federal civil
litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)15 grants targets of discovery
requests the right to seek protective orders limiting the scope of discovery if the
request is overly broad, seeks privileged information or would result in
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
In the past, when paper records were predominant, discovery targets were
typically required to bear the costs of locating, screening for relevance,
assembling and copying requested records. Today, the much larger volume of
potentially-relevant electronic records, exacerbated by very significant cost to
“convert” (decompress and reformat) network backup tapes into reviewable
form, has prompted some trial judges to shift some of these electronic record
discovery costs to the requesting party. The Zubulake decisions differentiated
five categories of increasing recovery difficulty and expense that are currently
relevant to determining EDD cost sharing:
1) Active online data on hard drives or active network servers;
2) Near-line data on removable media (e.g., CD-ROMs, floppy disks,
magnetic tapes);
3) Off-line storage or archived data of organized files on off-line
removable media;
4) Backup tapes organized not for convenient retrieval but for disaster
recovery, produced in time sequence (network throughput backups
made daily, weekly, monthly) and therefore intended primarily for
massive re-image restoration:
5) Deleted, fragmented data files recoverable only by forensic experts.
Active data files, generally found in categories one through three above are
accessible with the least costly restoration so discovery targets would usually
be expected to bear the costs of production. Archived, compressed and hidden
data recovery is more expensive and in some cases may require the specialized
14

See e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub.L.No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).

15

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(1)
services of outside forensic experts to decompress, reformat, organize and
search such files. In such cases, judges are becoming more sympathetic to cost
sharing between the requester and the discovery target. Sometimes a court may
agree that requested network backup tapes be sampled first, in order to predict
the effort and costs of the data recovery project before making decisions as to
requested cost sharing. Such cost balancing is authorized by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)16 permits judges to weigh the potential relevance of
requested documents against the burden on the target. The likely benefit of
discovery is evaluated against the litigation stakes, the parties’ resources and
the likely relevance of the proposed discovery to resolving the issues.
The Zubulake case provides an example of a court attempting to allocate
electronic discovery costs between the parties. SEC rules require broker/dealers
like UBS Warburg to preserve all external emails sent to customers for three
years, which UBS stored on optical disks making them relatively easy to
search. UBS was ordered to assume 100% of those search and production
costs. By contrast, proof of a gender discrimination claim would likely require
production of internal emails, and these were preserved by UBS only on
network backup tapes that existed in various files formats. UBS argued that
Plaintiff Zubulake should pay part of the cost of searching these backup tapes
because there were potentially 94 different network backup tapes needed to
comply with the discovery request. Instead, the Zubulake court ordered that 5
of the 94 backup tapes selected by Ms. Zubulake as most likely to contain
relevant emails be sampled to see how likely the remaining backup tapes were
to contain relevant information. UBS’s outside forensic expert billed nearly
$12,000 for producing 600 potentially relevant emails from these five backup
tapes, and the judge determined that 68 of the 600 recovered emails had
potential relevance. Generalizing from the sample, the judge ordered UBS to
pay 75% of the total $165,000 estimate for internal email restoration and 100%
of the attorney’s fees for reviewing and transmitting the relevant documents,
estimated at over $100,000.17 The scale of EDD restoration and recovery costs
illustrated in Zubulake are not atypical. Indeed, the $300,000 restoration and
search costs for emails in Zubulake is not unusual for a larger organization,
raising legitimate concerns that the cost of threatened discovery can be used
unfairly to force settlements. Some cases are limiting backup restoration for
this reason. Consider the “fishing expedition” concerns of Federal Magistrate
John Facciola when he declined to order the Department of Justice to do a full
search of potential backup tapes in the case of McPeek v. Ashcroft, a retaliatory
discharge claim by a former DOJ whistleblower.
If the likelihood of finding something was the only criterion (for ordering a
full search of backup tapes), there is a risk someone will have to spend
16
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hundreds of thousands of dollars to produce a single email. That is an
awfully expensive needle to justify searching a haystack. . . . . ordering the
producing party to restore backup tapes upon a (automatic assumption)
likelihood that they will contain relevant information in every case gives
the plaintiff a gigantic club with which to beat his opponent into
settlement. No corporate president in her right mind would fail to settle a
lawsuit for $100,000 if the restoration of backup tapes would cost
$300,000.18
The privately developed Sedona Principles advocate more equitable cost
sharing and hold some promise to influence judges’ allocation of these
burdens.19
5. AVOIDING CONSEQUENCES OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION
Parties always have a disincentive to produce documents that are incriminating
or which disclose proprietary information or strategy. However, litigation
process rules have long penalized the intentional destruction of evidence.
Spoliation is the improper destruction of documents, including email, of
potential relevance to a pending or forthcoming legal proceeding. The potential
sanctions for spoliation vary depending on the spoliator’s degree of fault and
either punish the spoliator and/or give justice to the requesting party. This
degree of fault varies with the spoliator’s “culpable state of mind” - that there
was a knowing destruction of evidence relevant to the opposing party’s claim
or defense. In spoliation cases the courts balance the degree of fault against the
degree of prejudice caused to the requesting party. Sanctions may include:
(1) Discovery sanctions (monetary fines);
(2) Attorneys fees and costs payments to the requesting party for
spoliation hearings;
(3) Additional discovery with the costs charged to the culpable party;
(4) Adverse inference instructions to the jury – permits the jury to infer
that the spoliation destroyed evidence favorable to the opposition’s
case and harmful to the spoliator’s case;
(5) Default judgment on a defendant (imposing liability) or dismissal of a
plaintiff’s case (an extreme remedy);
(6) Tort (civil) liability for injuries due to the spoliation.
5.1 Role of Document Retention and Destruction Programs
Electronic records management programs often include document management
18
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and document retention protocols to periodically eliminate unneeded
documents and records. There are justifications beyond the obvious selfserving effort to eliminate potential “smoking guns.” For example, the costs of
storage, management and discovery response are well-known. When
information is no longer useful or necessary for business purposes and no
federal or state law requires its retention, there is strong incentive to accept the
business reasons for destruction. Courts accept the balancing of
retention/management costs against the possible future use of such records in
litigation, if the document elimination policies are applied consistently and
without a sole purpose to thwart opposing parties in litigation. The key
standard is whether the potential discovery target could reasonably anticipate
such documents could be relevant to a likely or pending government
investigation or litigation.
Furthermore there must be clear proof that the document destruction program
or its execution is implemented with a specific intent to destroy relevant
evidence. Consider the recent U.S. Supreme Court reversal of the conviction of
Arthur Andersen for Enron-related document destruction.20 The 2002 criminal
conviction of Andersen was overturned because the trial judge’s instructions to
the jury were flawed, leaving this intent element unclear. An in-house Arthur
Andersen lawyer’s email reminded staff to faithfully execute “documentretention” policies on their Enron audit papers and this allegedly triggered a
extraordinary shredding of Enron audit documents just when, DOJ argued,
Andersen could “reasonably anticipate” the forthcoming SEC investigation.
This Arthur Andersen criminal conviction was arguably the direct cause of
Arthur Andersen’s collapse as clients defected. Thus, a simple reminder of
document retention program procedures is not, in itself, wrongful without
further proof of a conscious wrongdoing. Such wrongdoing would require
contemplation of a particular official proceeding in which the destroyed
documents might be material.
5.2 Record Retention Constraints
Legal requirements for document retention generally depend on three factors:
(1) the line of business, (2) the type of records in question and (3) the
significance of archived information to the business model. Government
regulations from various sources, federal, state, local even international
regulations, require the creation and maintenance of various business records.
Some retention requirements apply to most businesses, such as tax records
under IRS rules, wage and hour records under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
cradle to grave toxic chemical handling under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) or employee exposure records under regulations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Other requirements
20
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are specific to regulated-industries such as for railroads, airlines, public
utilities, nuclear power plants, federally-chartered or insured banks, securities
broker/dealers, commodities future commission merchants or registered
investment advisers. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) contains over
2,800 sections requiring record creation and/or maintenance. Retention periods
range from 30 days up to 50 years. Few federal agencies have email retention
rules yet, the SEC is at the forefront with rule SEC Exchange Act Rule 17a-4(f)
requiring broker-dealers to retain all correspondence with customers for three
years, and this specifically includes emails.21 Retained copies must be in a
“non-rewriteable and non-erasable” format that the SEC describes as follows:
Under the rule, the electronic storage media also must verify automatically
the quality and accuracy of the storage media recording process; serialize
the original and, if applicable, duplicate units of storage media, and timedate for the required period of retention the information placed on such
electronic storage media; and have the capacity to readily download
indexes and records preserved on the electronic storage media to any
medium acceptable under paragraph (f) as required by the Commission or
the self-regulatory organizations of which the member, broker, or dealer is
a member.22
Despite the SEC’s detailed email retention requirements, such regimes at other
federal and state agencies remain generally less detailed and frequently are
unclear. Most retention laws are adapted to electronic communications rather
than stated in language that is clearly and unequivocally applicable to
electronic communications. Indeed,
Donald S. Skupsky, a leading author in document retention practices argues
that existing federal records retention requirements may not clearly apply to
emails.23
5.3 Perils of Aggressive Document Destruction
It has been reported that at least some organizations employ aggressive email
destruction policies – erasure of emails after short time frames of 30 to 60 days.
The tacit reasoning is that if internal emails can be routinely eliminated, this in
turn will reduce the probability of the subsequent discovery of damaging
emails. Some document retention experts argue that most email is private
informal conversation deserving of the same treatment as face-to-face or phone
conversations. Thus they would argue we do not need to archive all emails for
21
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the same reason that we typically do not memorialize phone calls or personal
conversations. Such a position might require the identification and separation
of more official, “permanent” emails from “informal” emails. However, giving
senders or recipients an option to either archive or to eliminate prior
communications that may involve personal or corporate malfeasance or
criminal intent will likely seem unacceptable to many policy makers.
Institutional policies of aggressive email destruction can also increase the risk
of spoliation or obstruction penalties. Consider the SEC’s discipline and civil
fines against Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, U.S. Bancorp
and Salomon Smith Barney in 2002 for their alleged systematic destruction of
network email backups and departed employees’ hard drives.24 Second, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,25 the SEC rules issued there under and the attendant
internal control accounting standards issued by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board26 can arguably be interpreted to prohibit
aggressive email destruction, at least for publicly-traded companies.
Aggressive destruction arguably violates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act duties to
maintain “adequate internal controls.” Further, employee customs and
institutional practices regarding email often preserve copies in multiple
locations, on employee hard drives and in electronic and paper printouts.
Therefore, aggressive email destruction policies may effectively eliminate only
the organization’s primary copy of potentially incriminating messages, leaving
untouched secondary copies preserved by employees, service providers,
suppliers, customers, online and Internet service providers. All too frequently
such copies are held in less-friendly hands. A very invasive organizational
effort would be needed to effectively limit and destroy all internal emails, and
it must be expected that evasion and circumvention will frequently occur as
copies are surreptitiously retained by both senders and recipients for individual
defense and whistle blowing or retention is inspired by retaliatory motives in
support of opposing parties or perceived victims.
Electronic record management practices increasingly include deletion of
electronic file metadata using “wiping” programs that erase automaticallygenerated metadata on files, communications and Internet browsing history.
Consider how commercially available applications such as Metadata Assistant
by Payne Consulting27 enables removing metadata such as a document’s
author(s), various dates of file creation, printing or access and edits from files
to preserve confidential information before such files are released externally.
24
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Such tools are also useful to examine files submitted by opposing parties.
Metadata wiping is prohibited following a litigation hold. Care must be taken
because metadata can be falsified or surreptitiously supplied after wiping.
6. DISCOVERY NEGOTIATIONS
While courts are sensitive to limiting overly-broad and unjustifiably costly
discovery requests, legal negotiations are typically undertaken to narrow the
scope of a discovery request or to force a target to respond to costly pre-trial
discovery requests. For example, the Zubulake gender discrimination case
involved extensive motion practice, frequent court appearances and eight
separate court decisions, most on EDD discovery issues, resulting in very
significant fees for lawyers and forensic experts, and, ultimately, penalties for
delay tactics as well as adverse publicity for UBS. Non-responsive production
is all too frequently met with subsequent demands or court sanctions for failure
to respond. Hence it is often advisable, at the outset of litigation or regulatory
investigations, to negotiate mutually-agreed parameters for electronic
discovery – including the subject matter, time window, electronic formats and
production timetables. Many seasoned litigators can be willing to negotiate
discovery limits with experienced and reputable counsel and forthright clients.
Another area for negotiation can be the search criteria, keywords, search
strings, concept searching and other screening criteria used to identify and
search potential electronic files that might be relevant to the litigation.
7. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON EDD
Despite incremental judicial reforms, there are no clear signs on the legal front
that aggressive discovery of electronic information will slow anytime soon.
Indeed, it can be expected that a steady stream of publicity will reveal alleged
wrongdoing exposed via discovery of email and other electronic evidence. The
preservation and strengthening of an organizations’ “ethical culture” is a
fundamental concern in how an organization responds to EDD requests.
Organizational policies concerning preservation, monitoring and disclosure of
electronic records can significantly impact both employee morale and the
organization’s long-term survival and prosperity. Organizations that attempt to
deliberately limit electronic evidence accessibility and disclosure using
frequent email and electronic record destruction, risk establishing a perception
among their employees that this is done to hide unethical practices or
malfeasance, and therefore, by implication, risk establishing a corporate
perception that such activities will be shielded from pubic scrutiny or, by
implication, are acceptable. By contrast, an organization that is able to make
both internal and external electronic communications accessible for internal
review as well as electronic discovery requests, where applicable, projects a
culture of intolerance towards illegal or unethical activity. The ability to
monitor employee and corporate activities and to take corrective action as
necessary is an essential element of a strong corporate ethical culture. This
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approach might be implemented with routine preservation of all emails and
general backup in readily-accessible, well-organized and well-indexed central
archives. This in turn, should help to reduce the financial burden to responding
to EDD discovery requests and of screening potentially relevant files.
Paper record systems imposed very significant document storage costs as well
as discovery search and production costs. By contrast, the costs of electronic
storage continue to drop precipitously. New archiving, recovery and search
technologies from various third party EDD experts can simplify and reduce
EDD costs in the event of document requests. The SEC penalties against
Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and others in 2002 for the
failure to preserve emails, discussed earlier, as well as the 2005 award of $1.58
billion by a Florida jury against Morgan Stanley and in favor of Ronald
Perelman, which was assisted by an “adverse inference” instruction of the trial
judge to the jury that they could infer that Morgan Stanley’s failure to provide
requested email records was an indication of guilt, indicates that reliance of
slipshod retentions of emails only in network backup tapes can add significant
expense to EDD targets while also increasing risks of spoliation and
obstruction.
In summary, electronic data discovery has the unique capability of uncovering
evidence of internal and external actions and communications of many types
that were formerly inaccessible, and which can often be determinative in civil,
criminal, and regulatory litigation and investigations. Legal discovery practice
is evolving to catch up with rapid technological developments in
communications and data preservation and as a result, EDD can be expected to
continue to be a critical driver of modern litigation practice and therefore of the
burgeoning professional fields of cyber forensics. Landmark cases such as
Zubulake and emerging requirements of regulatory agencies for the
preservation of electronic communications in closely regulated business sectors
such as financial services are setting potential standards for retention and
management of electronic records that can be expected to spread to other
industries as well.
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